Over the past 25 years, China's transformation from a centrally planned to an increasingly market driven economy has led to substantial efficiency gains and rapid economic growth (Maddison, 1998; Fan, Zhang and Robinson, 2003) . However, as
Young (2000) has argued, the reforms may not have been sufficiently complete to improve domestic market integration. This could happen, for example, if increased interregional competition due to fiscal decentralization led local governments to impose a variety of trade protection measures against each other. Young's work has stimulated a series of studies to investigate trends in market integration. A recent survey by the Development Research Center of the China State Council (2003) indicates that China's domestic product markets have actually become more rather than less integrated.
Measures of regional protection have also declined significantly over the past decade. Wei and Fan (2004) show that output prices have become more integrated, and Huang et al. (2003) use evidence from the rice market to argue that China's commodity markets are becoming increasingly integrated as a result of the reforms. Based on a panel data set of 32 two-digit industries in 29 provinces, Bai et al. (2004) show that after an initial decline, there was an increase in regional specialization of industrial production. Piñera (1994) and popularized by Rodrik (1996) , reforms often follow a J-curve. That is, reforms may initially bring about more distortions but after the negative effects reach a certain threshold, the political imperative for in-depth reforms will emerge, creating positive effects in the long run (Krueger, 1993 Drazen and Vittorio (1993) that crises may be a catalyst for reforms. These laws and regulations may have helped remove measures of local protection in product markets and led to a reversal of the initial trend towards more market segregation.
It is also possible that market distortions shift from product to factor markets as the reform process proceeds. de Brauw et al. (2002) show that there has been a huge transfer of rural labor from the low-productivity farming sector to high-productivity nonfarm sectors over the past two decades, suggesting a shift towards a more integrated rural labor market. But this shift, particularly if accompanied by similar improvements in other factor markets, should be leading to some convergence in income levels among China's regional economies. This would follow in theory if the marginal returns to factors were equalized across sectors and regions. In reality, however, China's regional inequality has increased rapidly (Kanbur and Zhang 1999; Gustafsson and Li, 2002) , suggesting possible greater fragmentation in some markets. If the product and labor markets are becoming more integrated as evidenced by the studies mentioned above, then could it be that capital markets are becoming more fragmented? The dramatic increase in the number of reports on corruption within the banking and real estate sectors suggests that rent seeking behavior may indeed have shifted to the financial sector as the reform of product and labor markets deepened. 1 We address this question in this paper.
To assess the degree of factor market fragmentation, we divide the economy into barriers to factor flows across regions and sectors are removed. The paper concludes with our conclusions. The appendix provides additional details about our data.
II. CHANGES IN FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Driven largely by institutional reforms, the Chinese economy has experienced a dramatic transformation over recent decades. 3 The share of agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in total GDP declined from more than half in 1952 to less than 20 percent in 2001, while the share of the rural nonfarm sector increased from almost zero to more than a quarter. Coupled with these structural changes was a massive shift of labor from the lower productivity agricultural sector to the higher productivity nonfarm sector.
However, some factor markets are still fragmented and government policies still retain a significant urban bias. For example, the government still invests more in urban than in rural areas; universities require higher admission scores for rural than urban students;
there are still formal and informal restrictions on migration from rural to urban areas; and it is much harder for rural small businesses to obtain credit than the urban based, stateowned enterprises. The recent arrest and release of millionaire entrepreneur Sun Dawu for illegally accepting deposits from local residents highlights the difficulties of many rural nonfarm enterprises in raising funds from state-owned banks and credit cooperatives (Economist, 2004) .
The data in Tables 1 and 2 west and the rest of China has also worsened over time. Compared to labor productivity, the regional disparities in capital productivity are much smaller and they have narrowed over time. Table 2 shows that labor productivity grew the fastest in the rural nonfarm sector and slowest in the agricultural sector. Labor productivity began at a relatively low level in agriculture and the gap with other sectors is now much wider. The transfer of rural labor from farm to nonfarm activities will undoubtedly have enhanced overall economic growth and labor productivity. Regarding capital productivity, the rural nonfarm sector has again experienced the most rapid growth and by 2001 had achieved the highest level of all sectors. These disparities highlight capital market imperfections and the hunger for credit and capital that remains within rural areas for nonfarm activities. Broadening access to credit and investing more in the rural nonfarm sector would enhance economic efficiency and growth.
To put China's economic transformation in a broader international perspective, Table 3 compares the labor productivity of the industrial and service sectors relative to agriculture for China and several other Asian countries. The differences are stark. The labor productivity ratio of industry relative to agriculture is much higher in China than in other Asian countries. Moreover, while the ratios for other countries have generally remained stable or fallen, the ratio for China has risen substantially over the past 20 years. The same is true for the labor productivity ratio between the services and the agricultural sector. In the one hand, these extremely high ratios for China as well their increasing trends are symptomatic of major distortions in China's factor markets. On the other hand, there is clearly considerable potential for further economic growth simply by reallocating labor and capital among sectors. 
III. TRENDS IN PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION
In this section, we update Young's analysis of the trends in market integration to a more recent time period. Following Bai et al. (2004) , we use the Hoover coefficient of localization to measure the degree of regional specialization. This coefficient measures the geographic distribution of production activities within a sector. We define the Hoover coefficient of localization using our four-sector breakout of national GDP (farming, urban industry, urban services, and rural nonfarm) as:
where Y ij is GDP of sector i in province j; Y i is national GDP in sector i; Y j is national GDP in province j; and Y is national GDP. If L ij equals one, then province j has the same share of sector i as China as a whole. We rank all the provinces by L ij in descending order. Following the sequence, we calculate the location curve with the y-axis as the cumulative percentage of GDP in sector i over the provinces and the x-axis as the cumulative percentage of national GDP for all sectors over the provinces. Similar to the Lorenz Curve and Gini coefficient for income distribution, the Hoover coefficient of localization is defined as the ratio of the area between the 45-degree line and the location curve and the area of the entire triangle. Finally, we compute the average Hoover coefficients across the four sectors using GDP as a weight.
As shown in Table 4 and graphed in Figure 1 , the Hoover coefficients for the farming, urban industrial, and rural nonfarm sectors declined in the 1980s, indicting decreasing regional specialization in the early period of reform. The result is consistent with Young's finding on the evolution of the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors.
However, the coefficients increased in the 1990s, leveling off in most cases at values that were considerable higher than observed in 1978. In other words, regional specialization did improve with the reform process, but took some years to materialize. The Hoover coefficient for urban services increased the most (from 0.14 to 0.97), showing that this sector has become the most specialized. with the literature on the political economy of reform as argued by Drazen and Vittorio (1993) and reviewed by Rodrik (1996) that crises often precede reforms and reforms often follow a J-curve. The initial product market reforms may have brought about more distortions in the short run, but after the government responds to the crises by deepening reforms, the rents in the product markets have been squeezed out over time.
IV. VARIATIONS IN MARGINAL RETURNS TO CAPITAL AND LABOR
Having shown recent trends in product market integration, we turn now to an analysis of possible disequilibria in the factor markets. From economic theory we know that resource allocation is most efficient when the marginal products of each input are equalized across sectors and regions. By calculating inter-sectoral and inter-regional variations in the marginal product of each factor, we can uncover the degree of factor market distortions and hence the opportunities for achieving greater economic efficiency through improved factor allocation. 5 To calculate the marginal productivities of each factor, we use regional and time series data to estimate production functions for each of our four sectors.
Given the sector-wide shift in China's economic structure in recent decades, we chose a functional form that allows the input elasticities to vary over time in the estimated production functions. Also, to avoid potential heteroscedasticity problems due to large regional differences, we add regional dummies to the production functions. We specify the following functional form for sector i:
Where A it = a i0 + a it t + a itt t 2 , and B ikt = b ik + b ikt t. Y ijt is GDP of sector i in province j and X ijkt is the k th input for sector i in province j. R m is regional dummy for region m and C im is the corresponding coefficient for sector i. Within each time period (fixed t) and each sector, the production function is of Cobb-Douglas form. Because the output and input factors may be influenced by the same factors, it is likely that endogeneity will be present. However, due to lack of viable exogenous instruments for cross-sectional regressions, the treatment of endogeneity problems is often less satisfactory (Durlauf, 2001) . Since the main purpose of this study is to uncover the correlations rather than the causality between the input and the output variables, the potential endogeneity problem may be less serious.
It is well known that education levels between cities and rural areas are substantially different. However, since we do not have a suitable education variable that can capture differences in the education status of the labor force in different sectors and regions, we could not control for labor quality in the regressions. As a rough test of the potential biases that might arise from this simplification, we used the fact that the most highly educated part of the labor force is concentrated in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and re-estimated our production functions after dropping these cities from the analysis.
The results did not change significantly, providing some assurance that the results are not sensitive to our inability to control for labor quality.
A detailed description of the data used is provided in the Appendix. We used data The results of the estimated production functions for the four sectors are presented in Table 5 . 6 The estimated function for agriculture includes land as a separate input in addition to capital and labor. Because agricultural output is measured as value-added, intermediate inputs such as fertilizer are excluded from output measures by definition.
Including fertilizer and other intermediate inputs is more appropriate in estimating a
production function for gross output. The regression results for agriculture indicate that land still plays an important role in Chinese agricultural production and that even though the elasticity is diminishing over time it was still 0.332 even at the end of sample period.
The strong, positive coefficients on the time-trend variables imply that technical change played a vital role in driving Chinese agricultural production during the study period. The time-varying coefficients for capital and labor are positive and negative, respectively, suggesting that the agricultural sector has become more capital intensive and less labor intensive. The estimated labor and capital elasticities for urban industry do not change significantly over time. The urban service sector has become increasingly capital intensive, probably reflecting the heavy investment in urban real estate. The most striking phenomenon in the rural nonfarm sector is that labor elasticities have increased over time, indicating increasing returns to scale in the industry and greater alignment with rural China's comparative advantage.
Differences in estimated elasticities for the same input across sectors reflect differences in production technology, but on their own do not provide any indication of how efficiently resources are allocated. To obtain such insights it is necessary to calculate the marginal productivities of each factor. Given the estimated time-varying parameters, we can compute the marginal product of each factor using the following relationship:
where k denotes factor, i represents sector and j stands for province. B ikt is from equation (2).
To quantify the degree of variation in the marginal products of inputs, we use a Generalized Entropy (GE) inequality measure. Following Shorrocks (1980) , the variation in marginal product of factor k at time t can be written as: 4) where M ijk denotes the marginal product of factor k for sector i in province j, µ is the sample mean, w ij is the share of GDP of sector i for province j in total GDP. GE(0) is the mean logarithmic deviation, GE(1) is the Theil index, and GE(2) equals half the square of the coefficient of variation. We use the simplest form of this equation in which c = 0. The results for c=1 and 2 are similar to the results when c=0. Because each province has four sectors, we have 2,688 observations in total. Table 6 reports the variations in marginal products of labor and capital. The marginal product of labor has shown some convergence over the reform period, except in the last five years of our analysis (but which may be the result of some changes in the way the labor surveys were conducted during those years-see appendix). The overall variation in the marginal product of labor initially declined from 0.45 in 1978 to 0.29 in As is well known, the GE family of inequality measures can be decomposed into the sum of within and between group components for any given partitioning of the population into mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups. Using the ratio of betweeninequality to overall inequality, we can calculate the polarization index following the method outlined by Zhang and Kanbur (2001) . 9 Table 6 and Figure 3 present the sectoral and regional polarization indices for the marginal products of capital and labor. As more inter-sectoral variations in the marginal products of labor and capital contribute far more to overall inequality than inter-regional variation. In particular, the sectoral polarization index on the marginal product of capital has increased. This provides further evidence that as the reform process has deepened in the product market, rent seeking distortions may have shifted to the capital market. 
V. POLICY SIMULATIONS
How large are the potential gains from improving factor market performance? To answer this question, we use the estimated production functions in Table 5 to calculate the potential increases in national GDP obtainable from simulated factor reallocations.
Considering the low labor productivity in the agricultural sector, our first experiment is to move additional labor out of the agricultural sector. Using 2001 as a baseline, we evaluate three scenarios: moving 1%, 5%, and 10% of the agricultural labor force out of agriculture and distributing it equally among the other three sectors. As shown in Table 7 , even reallocating just one percent of the agricultural labor force could increase national GDP by 0.7%. If the share of labor reallocated is 5% and 10%, then national GDP would increase by 3.3% and 6.4%, respectively. In the second experiment, we simulate a change in the current urban biased policies by shifting investment from cities to rural areas while keeping total investment constant. 10 Reallocating 1%, 5%, and 10% of urban investment, respectively, to rural areas leads to gains in national GDP of 0.7%, 3.2%, and 5.9%, respectively. These are very similar in magnitude to the results obtained above by reallocating labor from agriculture to other sectors.
In the third experiment, we assume the government makes additional investment in rural areas, and that these are equally distributed between the agricultural and rural nonfarm sectors. Additional 10 billion Yuan of investment in rural areas yields an increase in national GDP of 0.2%, equivalent to 21 billion Yuan. This gives a very favorable benefit/cost ratio of 2.1. Considering that the farm and rural nonfarm sectors are labor intensive, this scenario would likely also help raise the incomes of many of the poorest people in China. When the size of investment increases to 50 and 100 billion, national GDP increases by 0.8% and 1.7%, respectively, with benefit/cost ratios of 1.7 and 1.82.
The policy simulation highlights the potential economic gains from reallocating factors from low to high productivity sectors. Removing barriers to labor movement, reversing the urban bias in government investment policies, and deepening the reforms would significantly enhance overall economic growth. In addition, these policy changes could also bring about favorable distributional effects by reducing regional and sectoral inequalities. Since large inequalities are a potential source of social conflict and instability, the far-reaching social impact of these policies could be equally important.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A key objective of China's reforms has been to reduce economic distortions and improve market efficiency. This paper examines the changing patterns of distortions during the reform process, shows how past policies contributed to these distortions, and estimates the cost to the economy in terms of lower output and greater regional and sectoral disparities. It is shown that after an initial period of increasing fragmentation in product markets, these markets became progressively more integrated as the reform process proceeded. The labor market also become increasingly integrated due to a large shift of the labor force from the agricultural sector to nonfarm sectors and with less control on worker migration. However, inter-sectoral differences in the marginal products of capital widened during the reform process, suggesting increasing segmentation of the capital market.
Local governments seem to have been a driving force behind much of the rent seeking behavior. In the early stages of the reform, distortions begot more distortions as Young has shown. However, in response to an initial increase in product market fragmentation, the central government implemented measures to remove local protection.
Consequently, as opportunities to collect rents in product and labor markets diminished, rent-seeking behavior simply shifted to the financial and land markets (including infrastructure and real estate). For local governments, these are the last two bastions for collecting rents, as well as breeding grounds for corruption.
If the reform process is evaluated on the basis of the performance of the product markets, then the observed behavior supports the J-curve theory of economic reforms:
initial distortions induced by the reforms soon disappear as the government responds and deepens the reform process. However, when a broader view is taken of all the relevant product and factor markets, the results support Young's argument that as some distortions in a partially reformed economy are removed, new distortions may appear, even if in other markets. The key to successful reform is to deepen the process to squeeze out the distortions in the capital and land market as well as in the product and labor markets.
The continuing large differences in both labor and capital productivity across sectors suggest that China still has great potential for further efficiency gains through continued structural change. To realize this potential, restrictions on factor movement, especially inter-sectoral capital movements, need to be removed. Efficient capital markets that can funnel new investment to sectors with higher returns still need to be developed.
The particularly higher capital returns in the rural nonfarm sector suggest that more aggressive government policies should be sought to increase investment there, or at least not to hinder capital movement to those sectors. Such policies would not only improve overall economic performance, but also narrow the development gap and inequality between the rural and urban sectors. Similarly, the government should also encourage labor movement from agriculture to rural enterprises, urban industry, and service sectors as labor productivity in these sectors continues to be much higher than in the agriculture sector.
While the empirical estimates and policy simulations reported here can help to provide rough orders of magnitude about the seriousness of the structural problems identified, policy recommendations for eliminating these distortions need to take into account complex issues, such as their political feasibility, sequencing, implementation problems, the nature of vested interests and ways to overcome them, the need to minimize negative side effects, and their effects on household equity, regional disparities and rural-urban inequality. Urban industry labor is estimated by subtracting rural industry labor from total industry labor, and urban service labor is similarly estimated as total service labor net of rural service labor. However, since 1997, the discrepancy between the labor data at the national level by sector and the sum of the data at the province level by sector has shown a large increase. Private conversations with officials in the China Statistical Bureau revealed that the national labor force data are more accurate because they are generated from either census or population sample surveys. The provincial labor force data are reported from lower level governments. When labor becomes more mobile, the difference between the two measures gets larger. In this paper, we adjust labor force data by sector for each province based on the values in 1996 and the annual growth rates of national labor force by sector. The measured trend in capital market integration still holds after this adjustment of the labor force data. However, the variation in the marginal product of labor increases slightly after 1997 when using the unadjusted rather than the adjusted labor force data. implicit assumption made here is that the provincial share of real gross investment equals the provincial capital ratio. However, his capital stock is not sector specific and cannot be used directly in our analysis. So we had to seek alternative approaches.
Capital stocks for the four sectors are calculated from data on gross capital formation and annual fixed asset investment. For the three sectors classified by SSB, the data on gross capital formation by province after 1978 was published by SSB (1997).
Gross capital formation is defined as the value of fixed assets and inventory acquired minus the value of fixed assets and inventory disposed. To construct a capital stock series from data on capital formation, we used the following procedure. Define the capital stock in time t as the stock in time t-1 plus investment minus depreciation:
Where K t is the capital stock in year t, I t is gross capital formation in year t, and δ is the depreciation rate. China Statistical Yearbook (SSB, 1995) reports the depreciation rate of the fixed assets of state owned enterprises for industry, railway, communications, commerce, and grain for the years 1952 to 1992. We use the rates for grain and commerce for agriculture and services, respectively. Since 1992, SSB has ceased to report official depreciation rates. For the years after 1992, we used the 1992 depreciation rates.
To obtain initial values for the capital stocks, we used a similar procedure to Kohli (1982) . That is, we assume that prior to 1978, real investment grew at a steady rate The capital stock for rural industry was subtracted from that of total industry (or secondary industry as classified by SSB) to obtain the capital stock for the urban industry sector. Similarly, the capital stock for rural services was subtracted from the stock for the aggregate services sector (or tertiary sector as classified by SSB) to obtain the capital stock for the urban services sector. Finally, the capital stock for rural enterprises was obtained as the sum of the capital stocks for both rural industry and services.
Prior to constructing capital stocks for each sector, annual data on capital formation and fixed asset investment was deflated by a capital investment deflator. The SSB began to publish provincial price indices for fixed asset investment in 1987. Prior to 1987, we use the national price index of construction materials to proxy the capital investment deflator.
It is worth noting that, when aggregating provincial capital stocks to the national level and comparing the aggregate with Chow's series for the common period of 1978-1988, we find the two series share a very similar trend. We also compare our provincial capital stocks with Li's. As shown in Figure 4 , the two data series are closely correlated to each other except in a few provinces. One outlier is Liaoning Province. Li (2003) reports that Liaoning Province has the largest capital stock with a value of 2,918 hundred 
